European Commission Enters the Chat: Ec’s Inaugural Decision on a Labor Market Cartel in Relation to No-poach Agreements and Recent Developments in Türkiye

EC’s Delivery Hero – Glovo Decision

On 2 June 2025, the EC imposed aggregate fines of EUR 329 million on Delivery Hero SE and Glovoapp23 SA for participating in a cartel that distorted competition in the online food delivery market across the European Economic Area. The infringement, which lasted from July 2018 to July 2022, involved:

• A mutual agreement not to solicit each other’s employees,
• The exchange of commercially sensitive information, and
• The allocation of geographic markets.

The EC found that these practices constituted a single and continuous infringement under Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and Article 53 of the European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement. 

This case is particularly noteworthy as it marks the EC’s first labor market cartel finding and the first sanction involving anti-competitive conduct facilitated through a minority shareholding. Delivery Hero’s gradual acquisition of shares in Glovo enabled access to sensitive information and strategic influence, replacing competition with collusion. While minority shareholdings are not inherently anti-competitive, this case highlights the risks associated with horizontal cross-ownership.

The investigation was initiated following market monitoring, whistleblower reports, and unannounced inspections in 2022 and 2023. The fines were calculated under the EC’s 2006 Guidelines, considering the duration, scope, and intensity of the infringement. Both companies received a 10% reduction under the 2008 Settlement Notice for acknowledging their participation and liability.

This decision underlines the EC’s commitment to preserving competition in digital markets and ensuring fair labor conditions, while also demonstrating the effectiveness of its settlement and leniency programs.

Turkish Competition Authority’s Enforcement in No-Poach Agreements

The Authority began addressing anti-competitive labor market practices, including no-poach agreements, in the early 2020s, earlier than many of its global counterparts. Several key decisions and the issuance of the 2024 Guidelines reflect the Authority’s evolving approach on the matter.

Private Schools in Kocaeli Decision

In a case involving private schools in Kocaeli^[2] , the Board found that schools had jointly determined tuition and meal fees and entered into no-poach agreements to prevent employee transfers. Coordination occurred via WhatsApp groups and meetings, with schools agreeing not to hire each other’s teachers and to jointly determine salaries.

The Board concluded that these practices constituted wage-fixing and no-poach agreements in violation of Article 4 of Law No. 4054 on Protection of Competition (“Law No. 4054”). On-site inspections revealed systematic efforts to restrict teacher mobility, including documented refusals to hire teachers at the request of other schools. These actions were praised within the group, indicating a coordinated and sustained effort.

The Board emphasized that such conduct restricts labor market competition and deprives employees of better job opportunities and fair compensation. Some of the implicated institutions admitted to the allegations and settled the case with a discounted administrative monetary fine, while some others were fully fined as a result of the investigation.

Private Hospitals Decision 

In another case, the Board investigated private hospitals in Bursa^[3] for gentleman’s agreements and coordinated wage-setting practices. Hospitals agreed not to hire each other’s personnel and jointly determined salary increase ranges.

The Board found that these practices violated Article 4 of Law No. 4054 by object, regardless of their actual impact. The conduct was classified as a cartel, and significant administrative fines were imposed.

Guidelines on Competition Infringements in Labor Markets

As mentioned above, the Guidelines put a step forward in an effort to clarify the legal framework for assessing no-poach and wage-fixing agreements.

Key points include:

Definition: No-poach agreements are defined as arrangements, direct or indirect whereby undertakings agree not to solicit or hire each other’s employees.

Scope: These agreements may apply to both current and former employees. Practices requiring mutual approval for employee transfers also fall within this scope.

Legal Basis: Such agreements are assessed under Article 4 of Law No. 4054 as market allocation restrictions and are treated as cartels.

Third Parties: The Guidelines emphasize that these agreements need not be direct; coordination through third parties may also constitute a violation, and such third parties may be held liable depending on the circumstances.

Conclusion

The increasing focus of competition authorities on labor market practices reflects a growing recognition that anti-competitive conduct in employment relationships can distort not only product markets but also the fundamental rights of workers to seek better opportunities and fair compensation. The EC’s Delivery Hero/Glovo decision and the Board’s recent enforcement actions demonstrate a clear shift toward treating no-poach and wage-fixing agreements with the same severity as traditional cartels.

The Authority’s proactive stance exhibited by its early investigations and the issuance of comprehensive Guidelines positions it among the frontrunners in addressing labor market competition concerns, including no-poach agreements. By clarifying the legal framework and gesticulating a zero-tolerance approach to anti-competitive coordination, the Authority clearly signaled that its response to such practices will be strict.

Going forward, undertakings must ensure that their human resources practices comply with competition law, particularly in relation to hiring, wage-setting, and employee mobility. Internal compliance programs should be updated to reflect the evolving legislation and enforcement landscape, and companies should remain attentive against informal or indirect arrangements that may restrict competition in labor markets.