NEWSLETTER-2020-metin

156 NEWSLETTER 2020 on. The rules and procedures concerning the application of this paragraph shall be established with a communiqué issued by the Board .” Accordingly, within the scope of the relevant Article, the par- ties may offer commitments in an on-going preliminary investigation or fully fledged investigation, with regard to Articles 4 or 6 of Law numbered 4054. If the Competition Board (“Board”) finds the offered commitments to be appropriate, the Board may render these commit- ments binding for the relevant undertakings and decide not to initiate a fully fledged investigation, or to terminate the ongoing investigation. On the other hand, with regard to a number of infringement types, the commitment mechanism shall not work. These types of infringe- ments are the hard-core infringements, such as price fixing between competitors, region and customer allocation, or supply restrictions that have been included in the “cartel” definition within the Regulation of Administrative Monetary Fines. In addition, after a decision regarding the termination of the in- vestigation or the preliminary investigation is taken, the Board may re-launch an investigation if: • There is a substantial alteration in any of the factors upon which the decision was based; • The relevant undertakings or associations of undertakings are in violation of the commitments given; and/or • The decision was based on missing, false, or misleading in- formation presented by the parties. • The commitment procedure aims to prevent the damages that occur as a result of competition law infringements at an early phase and, therefore, realize savings in time and costs for the public institutions and undertakings, which occur due to the detailed investigation processes that is required for the determination of the competition law infringements. As a result, when compared to the regular investigation processes, the investigations in which the commitment mechanisms are activated are concluded within a shorter timeframe.