Newsletter-21

136 NEWSLETTER 2016 Board evaluated whether an ‘efficient operator’ could operate with a ‘normal profit’ under such circumstances in the downstream market. The Board eventually concluded that the margin between Turkcell’s average retail prices in the downstream market, and the costs of an efficient operator was sufficient to operate in the market. In conclu- sion, no price squeeze conduct of Turkcell was found, and the relevant complaint was rejected by the Board. Conclusion Price squeezing is one of the forms of abuse under competition law. As specified above, a vertically integrated undertaking with a dominant position in the upstream market may cause price squeez- ing by increasing the price for the upstream product, by decreasing the price for the downstream product, or by doing both, concurrently. In this respect, a dominant undertaking may restrict the competition in the relevant market via transferring its market power over the up- stream product to the downstream market. Apart from the telecommu- nications sector, there are other investigations conducted in relation to price squeezing allegations in other sectors. Lastly, in order to prevent any anticompetitive conducts of price squeezing, and to provide and protect effective competition in the relevant markets, attention should be paid to the conduct of undertakings active in upstream and down- stream markets that are connected to each other in a production chain, and which hold dominant positions in the upstream market.